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ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS∗
BY SHUROJIT CHATTERJI AND JORDI MASSO´1
Singapore Management University, Singapore; Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona
and Barcelona GSE, Spain
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the
rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have
to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving
from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked
preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known
restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked
domains.
1. INTRODUCTION
Strategy-proofness plays a central role inmechanism design. A social choice function (SCF) is
strategy-proof if, for every preference profile, truth telling is a dominant strategy in its induced
game form. Hence, the potentially complex strategic decision problems of agents involved in a
strategy-proof SCF are extremely simple, indeed, for whether or not an agent’s strategy is dom-
inant depends only on the preferences of the agent and not on the other agents’ preferences.
Under strategy-proofness, the interlinked decisions become a collection of independent opti-
mization problems. Thus, the use of a strategy-proof SCF does not require (as any other solution
concept related to Nash equilibrium would) any informational hypothesis about the beliefs that
each agent holds about the other agents’ preferences, and the subsequent iteration of beliefs
until the preference profile becomes common knowledge. However, theGibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem states that requiring truthful reporting of preferences in weakly dominant strategies
implies dictatorship whenever preferences of agents are unrestricted. This fundamental result
has directed subsequent research on social choice in the presence of private information toward
suitably restricted domains of preferences that permit the design of anonymous, and hence
nondictatorial, strategy-proof SCFs. Particularly prominent in this regard is the class of single-
peaked preferences and its variants, and the strategy-proof SCFs characterized for such domains
are extensions of the median voter scheme.2 Single-peaked preferences are well known to have
desirable properties in the context of aggregation theory. They also provide the underpinnings
of many models in political and public economics.3
∗Manuscript received January 2016; revised July 2016.
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and Competitiveness, through Grant ECO2014-53051 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence
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Single-peaked preferences have been specified by postulating an underlying structure on the
set of alternatives that allows one to state for every triple x, y, and z of alternatives, that y is
between x and z, and so on, and the restriction imposed by single-peakedness is that if x is
top-ranked for a particular preference ordering, then y, by virtue of being in between x and
z, be ranked at least as high as z. This article formulates a more general concept of single-
peakedness in terms of a partial order on the set of alternatives with the property that every
pair of alternatives possesses a supremum under the postulated partial order.4 Our concept of
single-peakedness requires that for any triple x, y, and z of alternatives, a preference ordering
that has x as its top-ranked alternative should rank the supremum of the pair (x, y) at least as
high as the supremum of the pair (z, y).5
Our main finding is that this concept of single-peakedness is implied by the existence of a
strategy-proof and anonymous SCF that is determined completely by the profile of the agents
top-ranked alternatives (i.e., is tops-only) and satisfies additionally the innocuous requirement
of unanimity whenever such a SCF can be defined for an even number of agents and the
underlying domain satisfies a richness requirement.6 Our approach reconstructs the partial
order on alternatives in a natural way from the SCFwith the four stated properties. Observe that
the partial order depends on the particular SCF under consideration, and, hence, the derived
concept of single-peakedness may differ across different SCFs. Our methodology applies to
domains that allow the design of well-behaved SCFs for any even number of voters. Although
this restriction to an even number of voters is somewhat awkward, we do not necessarily view
it as a drawback of our approach, given that our intention is to reconstruct features of a domain
of preferences that allows the design of well-behaved SCFs for all societies; indeed, while our
methodology would not identify a domain that allows well-behaved SCFs to be designed only
for societies with an odd number of agents, one might argue that such a domain would be too
specific. The semilattice single-peaked condition identified by our methodology suffices for the
design of well-behaved strategy-proof SCFs for all, in particular odd, numbers of agents.
Fix a tops-only and unanimous SCF. Assume the number of agents is two and let x and y be
two alternatives. We say that x  y if and only if x is chosen at any profile of preferences where
one agent has x as the top-ranked alternative and the other y. The assumed axioms of unanimity
and anonymity imply that  is reflexive and antisymmetric, respectively. Our requirement that
the domain of preferences be rich ensures that  is transitive and that the SCF must be of a
particular form: At any profile of preferences, the social choice is the supremum of the pair
of alternatives that are top-ranked by the two agents. Our definition of single-peakedness now
obtains as a direct consequence of strategy-proofness. This methodology applies whenever the
number of agents is even. A similar finding holds under an additional axiom of invariance
when a SCF with the aforementioned properties can be defined only for an odd number of
agents. As a converse to our main finding, we show that any domain of preferences (there
is no richness requirement) that is semilattice single-peaked with respect to a partial order
possessing the supremum property admits a strategy-proof, anonymous, and unanimous SCF
that is completely determined by the profile of the agents top-ranked alternatives for any
number of agents.
In the literature on social choice on restricted domains, there has been interest in formulat-
ing a sort of converse to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; a statement that would identify
features of a domain that are implied by the design of a unanimous, strategy-proof SCF that
is “nondictatorial.” It has been conjectured that domain restrictions of the single-peaked va-
riety and SCFs of the median voter scheme form are salient in this regard.7 We formalize a
nondictatorial SCF using the axiom of anonymity and require additionally that the SCF satisfy
the tops-only property. For the complete domain, strategy-proofness and unanimity imply the
4 A partial order is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation.
5 Later, in the article, we explain this property and discuss why it may be seen as a weakening of single-peakedness.
6 Most well-known SCFs identified in the restricted domain literature generate binary relations that allow interesting
preference domains to satisfy our richness requirement.
7 Conjectures of this nature have been attributed by Barbera` (2010) to Faruk Gul and referred to as Gul’s conjecture.
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tops-only property. Given that we work in a restricted domain setting with no structure on the
set of alternatives, it does not appear feasible to derive the tops-only property as a consequence
of strategy-proofness and unanimity; we accordingly impose it as an axiom. Our methods lead
to a simple and fairly general version of a statement to the effect that a particular form of
single-peakedness is implied by strategy-proofness in conjunction with anonymity and other
natural axioms and that this form of single-peakedness suffices for the design of SCFs with
these properties. In particular, the semilattice structure on alternatives arises endogenously as
it is implied by the axioms on the SCF and a richness condition relative to the SCF and does
not rely on any a priori structure on the set of alternatives or preferences (apart from the
requirement that each preference has a unique top-ranked alternative).
1.1. RelatedLiterature. Anearly formulation of a partial converse statement to theGibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem is Bogomolnaia (1998). In a model with finitely many alternatives and
two agents, she identifies the features of any anonymous and tops-only SCF under which the
finite set of alternatives can be embedded into a finite-dimensional Euclidean space with a grid
structure with the property that the SCF takes the form of a (multidimensional) median voter
scheme. This embedding depends crucially on the set of alternatives being finite. These features
of tops-only and anonymous SCFs are stated in terms of the same binary relation induced by a
two-agent tops-only and anonymous SCF that we use in our study and are the following: (i) the
binary relation is transitive and a semilattice and (ii) the SCF is the supremum of the pair of
alternatives that are the top-ranked alternatives of the two agents. These findings are extended
to the three-agent case under similar, but somewhat more demanding, hypotheses, and she
derives additionally that the domain of preferences must be multidimensional single-peaked on
the set of alternatives. Our work extends this methodology in the following sense: We postulate
a richness condition on the domain in terms of the binary relation on alternatives induced by a
two-agent SCF satisfying our axioms and derive that the binary relation is transitive and that the
SCF has the supremum property. This is used to establish the salience of the supremum rule and
a version of single-peaked preferences in a general setting with an arbitrary number of agents
without requiring the set of alternatives to be finite. In particular, under our richness condition,
the set of alternatives need not turn out to be embedded in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space
with a grid structure as in Bogomolnaia (1998), but the identification of the SCF as a supremum
rule on our version of a single-peaked domain remains valid.8
More recently, work by Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b, 2010) and Chatterji et al. (2013)
provides formulations of such a converse statement. Our article complements these approaches
and is closely related to the approach of these papers in that our axioms on the SCF are similar.
However, there are important differences in the scope of our model and our methodology.
The richness condition in these papers is specified independently of the SCF whose existence is
postulated, whereas in our article, the richness condition is specified in relation to the SCF. But
more importantly, the methodology in these papers strongly relies also on the finiteness of the
set of alternatives and on strict preferences. The approach of Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b,
2010) assumes a specific structure on the finite set of alternatives by means of a given property
space fromwhich a betweenness relation can be derived. Again, their approach assumes that the
set of alternatives is finite and it is endowed with an a priori structure, the property space. The
richness condition in Chatterji et al. (2013) is specified in terms of alternatives that appear as the
first- and second-ranked alternatives in different preference orderings that make it specific to a
model with finitely many alternatives with strict preferences and also exclude the consideration
of preferences commonly employed in the study of multidimensional models. Our formulation
is more permissive in that we impose no finiteness requirement on the set of alternatives and,
provided the top-ranked alternative is unique, we admit indifferences. As a consequence, our
8 Observe that neither Bogomolnaia (1998) nor we pretend to characterize a subclass of strategy-proof SCFs on a
given restricted domain of preferences. Rather, the objective is to identify the key property of any domain that admits
a well-behaved and strategy-proof SCF.
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methodology is of necessity different from and somewhat more direct than that of those papers.
Many prominent restricted domains of preferences studied in the literature appear as special
cases of our formulation.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces basic definitions andnotation,whereas
Section 3 contains the main results for the case of an even number of agents. In Section 4, we
relate our results to the large literature on domain restrictions for nontrivial strategy-proof
SCFs. Section 5 elaborates on our methodology and axioms and gathers some final remarks. An
appendix contains an analysis of the case of an odd number of agents, the proofs of two results
omitted in the main text, and the case of a finite set of alternatives.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the finite set of agents, with n ≥ 2, and A be any set of alternatives.
We do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Each agent i ∈ N has a
preference (relation) Ri ∈ D over A, where D is a subset of complete, reflexive, and transitive
binary relations on A.9 The set D is referred to as the domain of preferences. For any x, y ∈ A,
xRiymeans that agent i considers alternative x to be at least as good as alternative y. Let Pi and
Ii denote the strict and indifference relations induced by Ri over A, respectively; namely, for
any x, y ∈ A, xPiy if and only if xRiy and¬yRix, and xIiy if and only if xRiy and yRix. We assume
that for each Ri ∈ D, there exists t(Ri) ∈ A, the top of Ri, such that t(Ri)Piy for all y ∈ A\{t(Ri)}.
For x ∈ A, letRxi denote any preference inD with t(Rxi ) = x. Moreover, we assume that for each
x ∈ A, the domain D contains at least one preference Rxi . A profile R = (R1, . . . ,Rn) ∈ Dn is an
n-tuple of preferences, one for each agent. To emphasize the role of agent i, we will often write
the profile R as (Ri,R−i).
An SCF is a mapping f : Dn → A that assigns to every profileR ∈ Dn an alternative f (R) ∈ A.
An SCF f : Dn → A is tops-only if for all R,R′ ∈ Dn such that t(Ri) = t(R′i) for all i ∈ N,
f (R) = f (R′). Hence, a tops-only SCF f : Dn → A can be written as f : An → A. Accordingly,
we will on occasion use the notation f (t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)) interchangeably with f (R1, . . . ,Rn).
An SCF f : Dn → A is unanimous if for all R ∈ Dn and x ∈ A such that t(Ri) = x for all i ∈ N,
f (R) = x.
To define an anonymous SCF onDn, for every profile R ∈ Dn and every one-to-one mapping
σ : N → N, define the profile Rσ = (Rσ(1), . . . ,Rσ(n)) as the σ−permutation of R, where for all
i ∈ N, Rσ(i) is the preference that agent σ(i) had in the profile R. Observe that the domain Dn
is closed under permutations, since it is the Cartesian product of the same set D. An SCF f :
Dn → A is anonymous if for all one-to-one mappings σ : N → N and all R ∈ Dn, f (Rσ) = f (R).
An SCF f : Dn → A is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N, all R ∈ Dn, and all R′i ∈ D,
f (R)Rif (R′i,R−i).
An SCF f is strategy-proof if for every agent at every preference profile R, truth telling is a
weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by f at R.
In this article, in addition to strategy-proofness, we will require the SCF to satisfy anonymity.
This is a key assumption in our analysis and is in some ways an opposite of dictatorship, as
the identity of no particular agent matters in determining the social outcome. The appeal of
this axiom is obvious. In addition, we will impose that the SCF also satisfy the tops-only re-
quirement. This axiom simplifies considerably the specification of the SCF, as well as the act
of reporting preferences and checking that there are no gainful manipulations and is pervasive
in the literature on the characterization of strategy-proof SCFs on restricted domains. This
axiom has some normative appeal, and it is of interest to study what sort of preference do-
mains permit the design of a strategy-proof SCF that is also tops-only. We discuss the role of
9 A binary relation  over A is complete if for all x, y ∈ A either x  y or y  x, it is reflexive if for all x ∈ A, x  x,
and it is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ A, [x  y and y  z] ⇒ [x  z].
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this axiom further in Section 5. The axiom of unanimity is natural to impose and is mild, as it
follows as a consequence of strategy-proofness whenever the SCF is required to be onto the set
of alternatives.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Obtaining the Induced Binary Relation. In this subsection, we assume that n = 2 and
indicate how to obtain a binary relation  from a tops-only SCF f : D2 → A and show that if
the SCF satisfies in addition unanimity and anonymity, then  is reflexive and antisymmetric.10
In doing so, we follow a procedure introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998).
Let f : D2 → A be a tops-only SCF. Define the binary relation  induced by f over A as
follows: for all x, y ∈ A,
x  y if and only if f (x, y) = x.(1)
An SCF aggregates individual preferences and can be seen as a systematic procedure specify-
ing how a society resolves its members’ disagreements. Hence, the binary relation induced by
an SCF f over Amay be interpreted as the outcome of this procedure applied to the family of
basic situations in which there are only two agents; the relation x  y reflects the fact that in this
scenario, the alternative x prevails over y.11 Wewill show later that if the SCF f is strategy-proof,
tops-only, and anonymous, then its induced binary relation  is transitive, provided that the
domain of f satisfies a richness condition. Here, we note that the following result is immediate.
REMARK 1. Let f : D2 → A be a tops-only SCF and  be the binary relation induced by f
over A. If f is unanimous, then  is reflexive. If f is anonymous, then  is antisymmetric.
Although this construction of the binary relation  induced by f : D2 → A over A might
seem very specific to the two agent case, we can extend this methodology to the case where n is
any positive even integer as follows.
Given a strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous SCF g : Dn → Awhere n is a positive even
integer, we start by stating the following fact that appears as proposition 2 in Chatterji et al.
(2013).
FACT 1. Let D be an arbitrary domain and let n be a positive even integer. Suppose there exists
a strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous SCF g : Dn → A. LetN1 = {1, . . . , n2 } andN2 = { n2 +
1, . . . ,n}.Then,SCF f : D2 → A, defined by setting, for all (R1,R2) ∈ D2, f (R1,R2) = g(R¯)where
R¯ ∈ Dn is such that R¯j = R1 for all j ∈ N1 and R¯j = R2 for all j ∈ N2, is strategy-proof, tops-only,
and anonymous. Moreover, if g is unanimous, then so is f .
In view of Fact 1, we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF
g : Dn → A, where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary relation  over A, where it is
understood that  is the binary relation induced by f over A where f is induced from g by
“cloning” the first n2 agents as agent 1 and the remaining as agent 2.
3.2. An Illustration of the Main Result. We use the prominent instance of a median voter
rule defined on a domain of single-peaked preferences (originally proposed by Black, 1948, and
studied by Moulin, 1980) to illustrate our main finding and summarize what the study tries to
accomplish. Following Moulin (1980), assume that the set of alternatives is the unit interval in
the real line endowedwith the linear order>; that is,A= [0, 1]. A preferenceRi is single-peaked
10 A binary relation  over A is antisymmetric if for all x, y ∈ A, [x  y and y  x] ⇒ [x = y].
11 Since the binary relation is not required to be complete, it may be the case that neither alternative prevails over
the other and f (x, y) is a third alternative z.
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FIGURE 1
THE SEMILATTICE OF A MEDIAN VOTER RULE
on A if there exists a unique alternative t(Ri) ∈ A such that, for all x ∈ A\{t(Ri)}, t(Ri)Pix, and
for all x, y ∈ A, xRiy whenever either t(Ri) ≥ x > y or y > x ≥ t(Ri). Let SP be the set of all
single-peaked preferences on A. An SCF f : SP2 → A is a median voter rule if there exists a
fixed ballot α ∈ A such that for all (R1,R2) ∈ SP2,12
f (R1,R2) = med>(t(R1), t(R2), α).
A characterization result in Moulin (1980) implies that any strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous, and unanimous SCF f : SP2 → A is a median voter rule.
So, assume the SCF f : SP2 → A is a median voter rule and let α be its associated fixed
ballot. Since a median voter rule depends only on the top-ranked alternatives of the agents’
preferences, it will be convenient to write f (R1,R2) as f (x, y) where x = t(R1) and y = t(R2).
We now apply condition (1) to f to generate a binary relation on A by saying that for all
x, y ∈ A, x  y if and only if f (x, y) = x. Since f (x, x) = x (the median voter rule is unanimous),
 is reflexive and since f (x, y) = f (y, x) for all x, y,  is also antisymmetric. It is, however,
not complete since if x and y lie on opposite sides of α, f (x, y) = α, and so x  y and y  x.
Furthermore, the domain of single-peaked preferences satisfies our richness condition (this is
formally defined in Subsection 3.3), and this will imply that  is transitive. As a consequence,
 is a partial order and (we will prove that in general) for every pair x, y ∈ A, sup(x, y) exists
and is given by f (x, y), so that  is a semilattice. Hence, f (x, y) = med>(x, y, α) = sup(x, y).
Figure 1 gives a geometric representation of this semilattice, where the arrows indicate the
direction of the partial order  on the interval [0, 1], so y  x whenever x and y are such that
either 0 ≤ x < y ≤ α or α ≤ y < x ≤ 1.
Our main result will show that for the strategy-proofness of the median voter rule f , one
does not actually need the domain of preferences to be single-peaked; it may be larger. To
see this, suppose agent 2 has the top-ranked alternative y and agent 1’s true preference puts
x on top. Strategy-proofness requires that f (x, y)Rxi f (z, y) for all z ∈ A, which is equivalent to
the requirement that sup(x, y)R
x
i sup(z, y). This last condition is our concept of semilattice
single-peakedness. Figure 2 illustrates a semilattice single-peaked preference Ri on (A,)
when sup A= α. Observe four features of Ri. First, Ri is far from being single-peaked on
A. Second, Ri is monotonically (not necessarily strictly) decreasing on the segment [t(Ri), α],
and hence single-peaked on it, for should there exist y, z ∈ (t(Ri), α) such that y < z and zPiy,
then f (z, y) = zPiy = f (t(Ri), y), a manipulation. Third, no condition is imposed between pairs
on [0, t(Ri)). Fourth, αRix for each alternative x ∈ (α, 1] and no condition is imposed between
pairs of alternatives on this segment. The reason underlying the last two conditions is that if
t(Ri) < α, then f (t(Ri), y) ∈ [t(Ri), α)], and hence how Ri orders pairs of alternatives that are
either below t(Ri) or above α is irrelevant for the manipulability of f .
We establish the following general version of the configuration presented above: If a prefer-
ence domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF for an even
number of agents, then the preferences must be semilattice single-peaked. We also establish
that given a semilattice single-peaked domain of preferences, we can define a strategy-proof,
tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF for any number of voters.
12 Given a list ofK real numbers (x1, . . . , xK), whereK is a positive odd integer, definemed>(x1, . . . , xK) = y, where
y ∈ R is such that #{t ∈ {1, . . . ,K} | xt ≥ y} = #{t ∈ {1, . . . ,K} | xt ≤ y} = K+12 .
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FIGURE 2
A SEMILATTICE SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCE
3.3. Rich Domains and Semilattice Single-Peaked Preferences. We now turn to a description
of the domain of preferences that we characterize in this article. First, we present the concept
of a rich domain on a set of alternatives endowed with a binary relation. Fix a binary relation 
over A. Given two alternatives x, y ∈ Awith y  x, define the set [x, y] as
[x, y] = {x, y} ∪ {z ∈ A | y  z and z x}.
If x and y are distinct alternatives and related by  as y  x, then the set [x, y] is obtained by
adding to the set {x, y} all alternatives inA that “lie between” x and y according to. For y  x,
define [x, y] = ∅.
DEFINITION 1. Let  be a binary relation over A. The domain D is rich on (A,) if for all
x, y ∈ Awith [x, y] = ∅ and z /∈ [x, y], there exist Rxi ,Ryi ∈ D such that yPxi z and xPyi z.
Richness says that for any pair of distinct alternatives x and y related by and any alternative
z not lying between x and y, a rich domain has to contain two preference relations with the
properties that, for one of the preferences, x is the top-ranked alternative and y is strictly
preferred to z and for the other preference, y is the top-ranked alternative and x is strictly
preferred to z. Our concept of a rich domain is relative to the binary relation induced by the
SCF that is applied to it. Thus, whether or not a domainD is rich depends on the particular SCF
f : D2 → A operating on it. Below, we will illustrate the concept of rich domain by means of an
example.
We now exhibit conditions under which  is transitive.
LEMMA 1. Let (D,A,) be such that D is rich on (A,). If there exists an SCF f : D2 → A
that induces  over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous, then  is transitive.
PROOF. Assume the three distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ A are such that x  y and y  z. We
show that x  z; namely, f (x, z) = x. First, suppose f (x, z) = w /∈ {x, y}. By strategy-proofness,
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f (x, w) = w. Hence, w  x  y and w /∈ [y, x] = ∅. SinceD is rich on (A,), there existsRx1 ∈ D
such that yPx1w. But then,
f (y, z) = yPx1w = f (x, z),
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f . Thus, f (x, z) ∈ {x, y}. Assume f (x, z) = y. But
then, by strategy-proofness, f (x, y) = y, a contradiction with x  y. Hence, f (x, z) = x and
x  z. Thus,  is transitive. 
A partial order  over A is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation over
A. A partial order  over A is a (join-)semilattice if for all (x, y) ∈ A×A, sup(x, y) exists.13
In Lemma 2 below, we will establish that the binary relation  induced by f on A is a (join-)
semilattice, provided that f is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous and D is
rich on (A,). We now turn to our concept of a single-peaked preference in this setting.
DEFINITION 2. Let  be a semilattice over A. The preference Rxi ∈ D is semilattice single-
peaked on (A,) if for all y, z ∈ A, sup(x, y)Rxi sup(z, y).
We say that a domainD is semilattice single-peaked on (A,) if it is a subset of all semilattice
single-peaked preferences on (A,).
Single-peaked preferences embody the idea that an alternative y that is “closer” to the top
x of a preference ordering Rxi than is an alternative z should be ranked at least as high as z.
We now argue that semilattice single-peakedness embodies in some measure this idea in its
treatment of those pairs of alternatives that arise as suprema under the semilattice . Given a
triple of alternatives x, y, z, we say that y is “closer” to x than is zaccording to the semilattice if
x  y holds and x  z y (equivalently, z ∈ [x, y]) does not hold. Now consider any preference
Rxi ∈ D and consider any pair of alternatives y, z. Assume first that sup(z, y)  x. Then, we
have x  sup(x, y)  sup(z, y) holds, so that sup(x, y) is closer to the top x of Rxi than is
sup(z, y). Even when the condition sup(z, y)  x does not hold, we have at any rate that
sup(z, y) /∈ [x, sup(x, y)], and here too sup(x, y) is closer to the top x ofRxi than is sup(z, y).
Indeed, the condition of semilattice single-peakedness requires that in this situation, sup(x, y)
being closer to the top x, should be ranked by Rxi at least as high as sup(z, y).
To better understand the concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness on (A,),
it is convenient to look at the semilattice (A,) as a partially directed graph. To make the
argument more transparent, assume A is finite and that sup A exists and is denoted by α.
Figure 3 represents an example of such a semilattice (A,) as a partially directed graph, where
A= {x, y, z, α, x1, . . . , x13}, and the direction of an arrow on the edge linking two alternatives
indicates how they are related according to the partial order; for example, x −→ ymeans that
y  x (arrows that can be obtained from the transitivity of  are omitted).
First, consider the pair of alternatives α, x. Since α  x, the set [x, α] is nonempty and
equals {x, y, z, x2, x3, x4, α}. Richness would require that there exist for the set [x, α],
two preferences Rxi ,R
α
i ∈ D such that αPxi v and xPαi v only for alternatives v ∈ {x1, x5,
x6, x7, x8,x9, x10, x11, x12, x13}.
We next illustrate the restrictions implied by semilattice single-peakedness on a preference
ordering where the alternative x is top-ranked. The definition of semilattice single-peakedness
imposes two sorts of restrictions on a preference relation Rxi (in addition to xP
x
i y for all y = x).
The first of these applies to alternatives that appear along any -path emanating from x. There
are two such paths from x to α (emphasized with bold-type links); namely, x  y  x3  z α
and x  x2  x4  z α. Along such paths, we have classical single-peakedness. Thus, since the
13 Given x, y ∈ A, sup(x, y) = z if and only if z is the least element in A that is greater than or equal (according
to ) to x and y; namely, z ∈ {w ∈ A | w  x and w  y} and, for all z′ ∈ {w ∈ A | w  x and w  y}, z′  z. Since  is
antisymmetric, if the supremum exists it is unique.
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FIGURE 3
A SEMILATTICE AS A PARTIALLY DIRECTED GRAPH
pairs y, zbelong to the first path, we have yRxi z. Observe that sup(x, y) = y and sup(z, y) = z.
However, note that since the alternatives x3 and x4 belong to different paths, there is no
restriction on the relative ranking of these two alternatives in Rxi ; indeed, if one were to apply
Definition 2 with x3, x4 playing the role of y, z, respectively, one only obtains sup(x, x3) =
x3Rxi z= sup(x4, x3).
The second restriction applies to alternatives that are not in a -path from x to α. Such
alternatives are dispreferred to the “closest” alternative in the path; namely, if w and r are
such that x  w  α, r /∈ [x, α], and sup(x, r) = w, then wRxi r (observe that sup(r, r) = r).
For instance, in Figure 3, yRxi x5 and yR
x
i x1 but no condition is imposed on the preference
between x5 and x1; moreover, take any z′, z′′ ∈ {x10, x11, x12} such that z′ = z′′ and observe that
sup(x, z
′) = z, sup(z′′, z′) = x12, and sup(z′, z′) = z′. Then, zRxi x12 and zRxi z′.
Finally, we enumerate below the restrictions implied on a preferenceRxi overA. By definition,
we know that xPxi y
′ for all y′ /∈ A\{x}. Semilattice single-peakedness imposes the following
relations amongpairs of alternatives (observe that inFigure 3, z is the supremumofA\{α, x13}):14
 yRxi x3R
x
i z since sup(x, y) = yRxi x3 = sup(x3, y) and sup(x, x3) = x3Rxi z= sup(z, x3).
 x2Rxi x4R
x
i z since sup(x, x2) = x2Rxi x4 = sup(x4, x2) and sup(x, x4) = x4Rxi z=
sup(z, x4).
 yRxi xk for k = 1, 5 since sup(x, xk) = yRxi xk = sup(xk, xk) (i.e., xk plays simultaneously
the role of y and z in Definition 2).
 x2Rxi x6 since sup(x, x6) = x2Rxi x6 = sup(x6, x6) (i.e., x6 plays simultaneously the role of
y and z in Definition 2).
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 zRxi xk for k = 10, 11, 12 since sup(x, xk) = zRxi xk = sup(xk, xk).
 αRxi x13 since sup(x, x13) = αRxi x13 = sup(x13, x13) (i.e., x13 plays simultaneously the role
of y and z in Definition 2).
Observe that semilattice single-peakedness leaves freedom toRxi on how it orders many pairs
of alternatives. For instance, we have already noted that the relative ranking of the pair x3, x4
is not fixed. Consider next the path x7 −→ x9 −→ x. Here too, letting x7, x9 play the role of y, z
in Definition 2 does not lead to any restriction on the relative rankings of x7 and x9 in Rxi since
sup(x, x9) = xRxi x9 = sup(x7, x9).
Proposition 1 below shows that the two restrictions used in the example characterize indeed
semilattice single-peakedness. After stating the main result of the article in Proposition 3,
we will be in a better position to comment on why semilattice single-peakedness emerges as
an implication of strategy-proofness (and other desirable properties) and can be seen as a
weakening of the classical concept of single-peakedness.
PROPOSITION 1. Let  be a semilattice over A. Then, the preference Rxi is semilattice single-
peaked on (A,) if and only if the following two properties hold:
(i) for all y, z ∈ A such that x  y  z, yRxi z;
(ii) for all w ∈ A such that x  w, sup(x, w)Rxi w.
PROOF. Assume that Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A,) and let y, z ∈ A be such that
x  y  z. Then, (i) follows because sup(x, y) = yRxi z= sup(z, y). Let w ∈ A be such that
x  w. If x  w, then (ii) follows because x = sup(x, w) and xPxi w. If x  w, then (ii) follows
since w = sup(w,w) and, by semilattice single-peakedness, sup(x, w)Rxi sup(w,w) = w.




holds by distinguishing among three cases.
Case 1: sup(x, y) = x. Then (2) holds trivially since x = t(Rxi ).
Case 2: sup(x, y) = y = x. The case sup(z, y) = y is trivial. If sup(z, y) = w = y, then x 
y  w and, by (i), y = sup(x, y)Rxi sup(z, y). Thus, (2) holds.
Case 3: sup(x, y) = w /∈ {x, y}. First, assume that sup(z, y) = y. Since x  y, by (ii), wRxi y.
Hence, sup(x, y) = wRxi y = sup(z, y). Thus, (2) holds. Assume now that s =
sup(z, y) = y. If s  x, then s is an upper bound of x and y. Hence, x  w  s.
By (i), wRxi s. Hence, sup(x, y) = wRxi s = sup(z, y). Thus, (2) holds. Assume fi-
nally that s  x. By (ii), r ≡ sup(x, s)Rxi s. Note that r is an upper bound of x and y.
Hence, x  w  r. By (i),wRxi r. Hence, sup(x, y) = wRxi rRxi s = sup(z, y). Thus, (2)
holds. 
3.4. Semilattice Single-Peaked Domains Admit an SCF with the Desirable Properties. Before
presenting the main result of the article in Proposition 3 below, we show that a semilattice
single-peaked domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF for
an arbitrary number of agents. This generalizes in a very simple way the converse of the main
result in Chatterji et al. (2013) to settings where A is not necessarily finite and the underlying
structure is not necessarily a tree.
PROPOSITION 2. Let D be a semilattice single-peaked domain on the semilattice (A,). Then,
there exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : Dn → A for all n.
Moreover, if n is even, then  is induced by f over A.
PROOF. We first establish the following induction step: Suppose for k ≥ 2, sup(x1, . . . , xk)
exists for every set {x1, . . . , xk} of k distinct alternatives. Then, for any alternative xk+1 /∈
{x1, . . . , xk}, sup(x1, . . . , xk+1) exists and is given by sup(sup(x1, . . . , xk), xk+1).
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To verify this step, let y = sup(x1, . . . , xk). By the induction hypothesis, sup(y, xk+1) exists
and is denoted by w. Since  is transitive, w is an upper bound for (x1, . . . , xk+1). Suppose there
exists v ∈ A\{w} such that v is an upper bound for (x1, . . . , xk+1). Then, it must be that v  y since
y = sup(x1, . . . , xk). We also have v  xk+1. These imply that v is an upper bound for (y, xk+1).
But since sup(y, xk+1) exists and is w, we must have v  w and so w = sup(x1, . . . , xk+1).
Given a preference profile R ∈ Dn, letG(R) = {x1, . . . , xk},k ≤ n, be the set of distinct alter-
natives such that for each r = 1, . . . ,k, xr = t(Ri) for some i ∈ N.
For every R ∈ Dn, define
f (R) = sup G(R).(3)
Since  is a semilattice, the induction step verified earlier implies that f is well defined. By
construction, f is tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous. We next show that f is strategy-
proof. Given R ∈ Dn and i ∈ N, let G(R−i) = G(R)\{t(Ri)} and observe that f (Ri,R−i) =
sup(t(Ri), sup G(R−i)). To show that f is strategy-proof, we wish to show for arbitraryR
x
i ∈ D
and Rzi ∈ D, z ∈ A\{x},
f (Rxi ,R−i) = sup(x, sup G(R−i))Rxi sup(z, sup G(R−i)) = f (Rzi ,R−i).(4)
By the definition of f in (3) and the definition of semilattice single-peakedness, (4) holds.
It is straightforward to verify that when n is an even positive integer,  is induced by f as
defined following Fact 1. 
3.5. Results for the Case of n Even. Wenowproceed by first showing that any strategy-proof,
tops-only, and anonymous SCF f : D2 → A can be seen as the supremum of the binary relation
 induced by f over A, provided that the domain of f is rich on (A,).15
LEMMA 2. Let (D,A,) be such thatD is rich on (A,). If there exists an SCF f : D2 → A that
induces  over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous, then for all x, y ∈ A, f (x, y) =
sup(x, y).
PROOF. Let x, y ∈ A and assume first that x = y. If f (x, y) = x, then x  y. By strategy-
proofness, f (x, x) = x and hence, x  x. Thus, x = sup(x, y). Similarly if f (x, y) = y. Assume
f (x, y) = z /∈ {x, y}. By strategy-proofness, f (z, y) = f (x, z) = z. Hence, z x and z y. Thus,
z is an upper bound of (x, y). Assume z = sup(x, y); namely, there exists z¯ ∈ A, z¯ = z, such that
z¯ x and z¯ y and either z z¯ or z is not comparable to z¯. In either case, we have z¯ z, and
hence, z /∈ [x, z¯] = ∅. Furthermore, we have f (z¯, y) = z¯. Since D is rich on (A,), there exists
Rx1 ∈ D such that z¯Px1z. But then,
f (z¯, y) = z¯Px1z= f (x, y),
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f . Assume now that x = y and f (x, x) = z. We want
to show that sup(x, x) = z. Suppose not; i.e., there exists w ∈ A such that w  x and either
z w or z is not comparable to w. In either case, we have w  z and so z /∈ [x, w] = ∅. Since D
is rich on (A,), there exists Rx1 ∈ D such that wPx1z. But then,
f (w, x) = wPx1z= f (x, x),
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f . 
15 Subsection 5.2 contains an example of a set A and a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f
on a domain that is not rich on (A,) with the property that  is not a semilattice and f does not take the supremum
form.
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Lemmas 1 and 2 do not require that the SCF should be unanimous. If the SCF f in Lemmas
1 and 2 is unanimous, then the binary relation  induced by f over A is reflexive. Similarly,
if the SCF g in Fact 1 is unanimous, then so is f . From now on we will be interested only in
unanimous SCFs.
Recall that (in view of Fact 1) when we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and
unanimous SCF g : Dn → A, where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary relation over
A, it is understood that  is the binary relation induced by f over A where f is induced from
g by “cloning” the first n2 agents as agent 1 and the remaining as agent 2. We now state our
principal finding.
PROPOSITION 3. Let (D,A,) be such thatD is rich on (A,). If there exists an SCF g : Dn → A,
where n is a positive even integer that induces  over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous, and unanimous, then (i)  is a semilattice over A, (ii) for all x, y ∈ A, f (x, y) = sup(x, y),
where f is induced from g, and (iii) D is semilattice single-peaked on (A,).
PROOF. The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. To show that
the condition specified in Definition 2 holds, observe that by Lemma 2 and strategy-proofness,
f (x, y) = sup(x, y)Rx1 sup(z, y) = f (z, y). 
In light of Proposition 3, we are now ready to comment on why semilattice single-peakedness
becomes necessary and constitutes a weakening of single-peakedness. Condition (i) in Propo-
sition 1 inherits (only partially) the general concept of single-peakedness: The preference is
decreasing when alternatives are farther from the top, according only to the increasing direc-
tion of the partial order (i.e., x  y  z implies yRxi z). To see why no condition is imposed
on the preference in the decreasing direction of the partial order (i.e., z y  x), fix x ∈ A,
Rxi and an SCF f with the desirable properties (and its induced semilattice  over A). Define
the set of options left open by x at f as the set of alternatives that may be selected by f for
some top alternative of the other agent; namely, of (x) = {z ∈ A | z= f (x, y) for some y ∈ A}.
We know from the maximal domain literature that,16 to guarantee that f be strategy-proof,
Rxi has to be single-peaked only on o
f (x). But observe that according to (ii) in Proposition 3,
of (x) = {z ∈ A | z x}. Hence, y, z /∈ of (x) whenever z y  x. This explains the form of con-
dition (i) in Proposition 1. Moreover, if x  z, then, by (ii) in Proposition 3, strategy-proofness,
and unanimity, sup(x, z) = f (x, z)Rxi f (z, z) = z, which implies that condition (ii) in Proposition
1 holds.
4. RELATED LITERATURE
In this section, we relate our results to the large literature on restricted domains. The starting
point of this approach is to assume that the set of alternatives A has a particular structure (e.g.,
A is a linearly ordered set). Using this structure, one can define a meaningful domain restriction
on preferences overA (e.g., single-peakedness) under which nontrivial strategy-proof SCFs can
be defined (e.g., the median voter rule). Our Proposition 2 (and its proof) follows partially this
approach. We start by hypothesizing that the set A, together with the binary relation , is a
semilattice from which we define the domain D of semilattice single-peaked preferences on
(A,). We then show that there exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous
SCF f on the domainD that, when n is a positive even integer, is such that is induced by f over
A. We want to emphasize, however, that our main contribution is Proposition 3, which follows
a very different approach. Without assuming any structure on the set of alternatives A, we
suppose that there is a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF g on a given
domainD of preferences overA. Following Bogomolnaia (1998), we show how to identify using
16 See, for instance, Barbera` et al. (1999), Berga and Serizawa (2000), Ching and Serizawa (1998), Hatsumi et al.
(2014), and Serizawa (1995).
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condition (1) a binary relation  over A. Then, provided that the domain D is rich on (A,),
we prove that (A,) is a semilattice, the domain D is semilattice single-peaked on (A,),
and g can be obtained as the supremum rule of a two-agent SCF f induced from g. Hence,
the semilattice structure on A follows from the existence of an SCF satisfying the desirable
properties without imposing any condition on A whatsoever. We now relate with more detail
our results to some representative results of the restricted domains literature. In particular,
we consider well-studied SCFs in this literature and uncover the associated semilattice that is
implicit in each formulation.
4.1. Single-Peaked Preferences on a Line. We return to the median voter rule f : D2 → A
(whereA= [0, 1]), represented by a fixed ballot α ∈ A and already presented in Subsection 3.2.
Let  be the binary relation induced by f on A. As we have already seen, the following facts
hold:
(1) The median voter rule f is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous on D.
(2) The binary relation  induced from f using (1) is as follows: If either y < x ≤ α or
α ≤ x < y, then x  y and if x > α > y, then x  y and y  x.
(3) The domain of single-peaked preferences SP is rich on (A,) and is a strict subset of
the set of all semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,), already represented in
Figure 2.
(4) For all x, y ∈ A, f (x, y) = sup(x, y) = med>{x, y, α}.
Moreover, the following fact can be verified:
(1) The domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the intersection of all semilattice
single-peaked preferences, where each of these sets is associated to each of all possible
values α inA. In other words, the set of single-peaked preferences is the largest preference
domain that is semilattice single-peaked relative to all binary relations induced by all
median voter rules (i.e., all strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCFs).
4.2. Semi-Single-Peaked Preferences. In the previous subsection, the set of alternatives was
assumed to be linearly ordered, and single-peakedness of preferences and the median was de-
fined with respect to this linear order. We now turn to a more general formulation where the
alternatives are arranged on a tree. In this case, one may move away from the top of a prefer-
ence in more than two directions. Single-peakedness on a tree, introduced by Demange (1983)
and studied further by Danilov (1994),17 requires preferences to be monotonically nonincreas-
ing along such directions. Subsequent work by Chatterji et al. (2013) shows that full single-
peakedness in this sense is not required for the design of strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous,
and unanimous SCFs. They identify a weaker concept called semi-single-peakedness, which is
an implication of strategy-proofness and the other properties and suffices for the design of such
SCFs. The specification of semi-single-peakedness requires the selection of a particular alter-
native on the tree, called the threshold, whose projection on each path on the tree corresponds
to a fixed ballot on that path, and the preference restriction of semi-single-peakedness on each
path coincides with the one depicted in Figure 4. We proceed by first summarizing their findings
and by showing that their formulation is a special case of semilattice single-peakedness.
Assume that the set of alternatives A is a finite tree; that is, for every pair of alternatives
(nodes) x, y ∈ A, there is a unique path p linking them, denoted by 〈x, y〉. Two alternatives
x, y are directly linked if 〈x, y〉 = {x, y}.18 Given alternatives x, y, z ∈ A, let π(z, 〈x, y〉) denote
17 Savaglio and Vannucci (2014) extend the analysis to graphs that are not necessarily trees. We further comment on
this article in Subsection 5.3. Schummer and Vohra (2002) also study a model where the set of alternatives is possibly
infinite and arranged as a graph. They consider separately the case where the graph is a tree and the case where the
graph has cycles. They characterize strategy-proof and onto SCFs assuming preferences are Euclidean, which satisfy
our richness condition.
18 See Example 3 in Subsection 5.3 for a description of how, given a domain of preferences, to directly link two
alternatives.
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FIGURE 4
THE PROJECTION OF A THRESHOLD ON A PATH ON A TREE
the projection of z on the path 〈x, y〉 that is defined as the unique alternative w ∈ A such that
〈x, z〉 ∩ 〈y, z〉 = 〈w, z〉. A path p is “maximal” if it cannot be extended by adding more edges
at either one of the two ends. Fix a particular alternative α on the tree A (call it the threshold),
and use it to specify a threshold on everymaximal path p , denoted by λ(p), as λ(p) = π(α, p).
Thus, for every maximal path p , if it contains the alternative α, set λ(p) = α; otherwise, the
threshold λ(p) is the unique alternative that lies on every path from an alternative on the path
p to alternative α.19
Given A with a tree structure and the threshold α ∈ A, Chatterji et al. (2013) say that a
preference Ri is semi-single-peaked with respect to the threshold α if for all x, y ∈ A:
(i) [x, y ∈ p such that x, y ∈ 〈t(Ri), λ(p)〉 and x ∈ 〈t(Ri), y〉] ⇒ [xRiy] and
(ii) [x ∈ p such that λ(p) ∈ 〈t(Ri), x〉] ⇒ [λ(p)Rix].
Moreover, they define the two-agent SCF f , where for all x, y ∈ A,
f (x, y) = π(α, 〈x, y〉).(5)
They show that the SCF f definedby (5) is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, andunanimous
on the domain of semi-single-peaked preferences on the tree Awith respect to the threshold α.
The following facts can be verified:
(1) The binary relation  on A induced by f from (1) is such that for all x, y ∈ A,
x  y if and only if x = π(α, 〈x, y〉).
(2) The domain of all semi-single-peaked preferences with respect to α is rich on (A,), so
that (A,) is a semilattice and for all x, y ∈ A, f (x, y) = sup(x, y). Figure 4 illustrates
this construction.
(3) The set of strict semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,) coincides with the set of
semi-single-peaked preferences with respect to the threshold α.
19 The threshold seeks to identify an alternative on the path p that is “closest” to α. In the absence of a distance,
the closest alternative is one that belongs to every path emanating from any alternative on p to α. On a tree, such an
alternative is uniquely identified.
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4.3. MultidimensionalModels. Inmany social choice problems, alternatives aremultidimen-
sional. To describe an alternative, one has to specify the level reached in each of its attributes.
Our setting also includes these cases. Border and Jordan (1983) and Barbera` et al. (1993) are
prototypical examples of this approach, and they can be seen as extensions of Moulin (1980).
We first relate our results with the main ones contained in these two papers and, second, with
the results in Barbera` et al. (1991) on voting by quota, the case when each attribute can take
only two possible values.
4.3.1. Multidimensional single-peaked preferences. We begin by postulating a multidimen-
sional structure on the set of alternatives A, and specifying a restricted domain. A preference
with top x is multidimensional single-peaked on A if an alternative z that lies on the shortest
path from x to y is weakly preferred to y. General results in Border and Jordan (1983) and
Barbera` et al. (1993) imply that strategy-proof SCFs satisfying our properties are component-
wise median voter rules. We first provide the details of this formulation and then identify it as
a special instance of semilattice single-peakedness.





where, for each k = 1, . . . ,K, Ak ⊆ R can be finite or infinite.20 Define the L1-norm in A as





Given x, y ∈ A, let
MB(x, y) = {z ∈ A | ‖x− y‖ = ‖x− z‖ + ‖z− y‖}
be the minimal box containing x and y.
A preference Ri ∈ D is multidimensional single-peaked on A if, for all y ∈ MB(x, t(Ri)), yRix
holds (namely, alternatives that lie on a L1-path going from x to t(Ri) should be ranked at least
as high as x).21 LetMSP be the set of all such preferences on A.
Let f : MSP2 → Abe an anonymous andunanimous SCF.Then, f is strategy-proof if and only
if there exists a vector of fixed ballots α = (α1, . . . , αK) ∈ A such that for all (R1,R2) ∈ MSP2
and k = 1, . . . ,K,
f k(R1,R2) = med>(tk(R1), tk(R2), αk).
Consider a tops-only SCF f : MSP2 → A and let  be the semilattice obtained from f using
(1). Furthermore, assume f is strategy-proof, anonymous, and unanimous and let α ∈ A be its
associated vector of fixed ballots. The following facts can be verified:
(1) For all x, y ∈ A,
x  y if and only if x ∈ MB(y, α).
20 Border and Jordan (1983) study the infinite case, whereas Barbera` et al. (1993) study the finite case.
21 It is possible to show that the set of star-shaped and separable preferences on A (defined in Border and Jordan,
1983) coincides with the set of multidimensional single-peaked preferences on A.
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FIGURE 5
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF MINIMAL BOXES CHARACTERIZING SEMILATTICE SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
(2) The set of all multidimensional single-peaked preferencesMSP is rich on (A,), so that
(A,) is a semilattice and for all x, y ∈ A, f (x, y) = sup(x, y).
(3) Let x ∈ A. The preference Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A,) if and only if for all
y, z ∈ A such that y ∈ MB(x, α) ∩MB(x, z), yRxi z.We illustrate this fact in Figure 5 for the
case K = 2 (see Section A.2 in the Appendix for a general proof of this statement). Ob-
serve that y ∈ MB(x, α), y ∈ MB(x, z), y ∈ MB(x, w), and sup(x, y) = yRxi z= sup(z, y)
and sup(x, w) = yRxi w = sup(w,w).
(4) As in the unidimensional case, the set MSP is the intersection of all sets of semilattice
single-peaked preferences, where each of these sets is associated with each of all possible
values α in A.
4.3.2. Voting by committees and separable preferences. Barbera` et al. (1991) show another
example of a domain restriction, where, given a finite set of objectsK = {1, . . . ,K}, agents have
to choose a subset (possibly empty) of K. It can be described as follows: The set of alternatives
is the family 2K of all subsets of K that can be identified with the K-dimensional hypercube
{0, 1}K. Namely, any set X ∈ 2K can be described as the vector x ∈ {0, 1}K where, for each
k = 1, . . . ,K, xk = 1 if and only if k ∈ X. Barbera` et al. (1991) identify the domain of separable
preferences and characterize the class of strategy-proof SCFs with our properties as voting by
quota. Separable preferences allow agents to evaluate objects as “good” or “bad.” A voting by
quota specifies an integer number for each object such that the object is included in the chosen
subset if and only if the number of agents who declared it as being good is at least as large as this
number. We proceed by specifying the details of this setup and briefly indicating the semilattice
structure associated with it.
A (strict) preferenceRi onA is said to be separable if adding an object to a given set makes the
new set better if and only if the added object is good (as a singleton set, the object is preferred
to the empty set). In the hypercube representation of 2K, separability ofRi implies the following
feature. Let x be the vector of 0s and 1s representing the best subset of objects according to Ri,
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and take any pair of vectors y and z of 0s and 1s ( i.e., two subsets of objects Y and Z). From z,
obtain x by iterating the following procedure: Take a coordinate of z that does not coincide with
the corresponding coordinate of x and replace it by the coordinate of x, obtaining z′. Proceed
similarly from z′ until x is reached. Then, yRiz if y is obtained in at least one of the steps of these
procedures starting at z to obtain x. Let S be the set of all separable preferences on {0, 1}K.
For simplicity, we consider two agent SCFs. Following Barbera` et al. (1991), an SCF f : S2 →
{0, 1}K is voting by quota (not necessarily neutral) if there exists q ∈ {1, 2}K such that for all
(R1,R2) ∈ S2 and all k = 1, . . . ,K,
f k(R1,R2) = 1 if and only if #{i ∈ N | tk(Ri) = 1} ≥ qk.(6)
A characterization result in Barbera` et al. (1991) implies that any strategy-proof, tops-only,
anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : S2 → {0, 1}K is voting by quota. We indicate now how this
setting relates to our result.
Let f : S2 → {0, 1}K be a voting by quota q. Let the binary relation  be induced from f
using (1). The set of all separable preferences is rich on ({0, 1}K,) and is a subset of semilattice
single-peaked preferences on ({0, 1}K,).
It turns out that the binary relation  has an interesting equivalent representation (which we
formally verify in Section A.3 in the Appendix) that can be directly expressed using the quotas:
For all x, y ∈ {0, 1}K,
x  y if and only if x ∈ MB(α, y),
where MB(α, y) is as defined in Subsection 4.3.1 and the vector α ∈ {0, 1}K is as follows: For
every k = 1, . . . ,K, set
αk =
{
1 if qk = 1
0 if qk = 2.
Moreover, it is easy to show that α = sup{0, 1}K.
Finally, it is easy to see that the set of separable preferences is the intersection of all semilattice
single-peaked preferences as the quotas vary across all possible values.
5. FINAL REMARKS
Wefinish the articlewith somefinal remarks related to issues left aside during the presentation
of the main results.
5.1. Our Approach and Our Axioms. An important feature of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem is that it puts no a priori structure on the set of alternatives. The restricted domains
literature typically proceeds by restricting the formulation to finitely many alternatives with
strict preferences or by restricting attention to SCFs that satisfy continuity and are defined
over continuous preferences. We do not assume any structure of the set of alternatives. Our
approach relies on assuming a common domain of preferences for the agents. As shown by
Le Breton and Weymark (1999, proposition 1), under the assumption of a common domain of
preferences, strategy-proof SCFs are such that each preference has a nonempty set of maximal
elements on the range of the SCF, and, furthermore, the SCFs satisfy an appropriate version of
unanimity.22 We specialize to the case where there is a unique maximal element for each pref-
erence. This assumption excludes models where the set of alternatives has private components
22 These results do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Their subsequent analysis assumes
continuity of preferences.
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since an agent would be indifferent among alternatives when the private components of others
change.23
Our approach relies on the tops-only property that allows us to associate to each SCF the
binary relation defined in (1). The anonymity of the SCF is another key axiom that guarantees
the antisymmetry of the binary relation, whereas the richness assumption guarantees that it
is a partial order. Specifically, our semilattice single-peakedness condition requires that the
supremum of a pair not be ranked higher than the supremum of a particular pair and thus
admits indifferences since it is the negation of strict preferences. This condition is predicated
upon a partial order with the supremum property; the antisymmetry of this partial order is
indispensable to this condition. These features of our approach allow us to sidestep the usual
restrictions like finiteness of the set of alternatives and the strictness and/or continuity of
preferences that were alluded to above.
We next discuss in greater detail the role of the tops-only axiom on the SCF. We begin with
the tops-only property. The usual justification for this axiom is that it affords very significant
descriptive and computational advantages. This property allows us to derive the binary relation
on the set of alternatives from the SCF and thus is crucial to our analysis. What can be said if
one drops this axiom? We present an example that suggests that it would be difficult to derive
interesting domain restrictions without the tops-only axiom. The example specifies a prefer-
ence domain that has no single-peaked-type structure but nonetheless admits a unanimous,
anonymous, and strategy-proof SCF. This SCF is, however, not tops-only.
EXAMPLE 1. Let A= {x, y, z, w} be the set of alternatives and D the domain of five strict
preferences:
Px Py Pz P
′z Pw
x y z z w
y x y w z
w w w x x
z z x y y
Consider the strategy-proof, nontops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : D2 → A
defined by the following table:
f Px Py Pz P
′z Pw
Px x y y w w
Py y y y w w
Pz y y z z w
P
′z w w z z w
Pw w w w w w
Onemaywonderwhether the fact that no structure is implied by the existence of a unanimous,
anonymous, strategy-proof SCF (as seen in Example 1) is driven by the feature that the domain
contains too “few” preferences. It might be possible to formulate a concept of richness for
nontops-only SCFs and make some progress on this issue, but the methodology would be very
different and presumably much more complicated than the one considered in this article.
Another way to drop the tops-only axiom and still derive restrictions on domains would be to
strengthen the richness requirement so that the tops-only property follows as a consequence of
23 See, for instance, Sprumont (1991) andBarbera` et al. (2016).Moulin (1984) andBerga (1998) indicate thedifficulties
of extending our results to a setting where agents’ preferences may have several tops, even in models with pure public
goods. Extending our analysis to these cases is interesting and left for future work.
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strategy-proofness and unanimity. There indeed are results on restricted domains establishing
that tops-onlyness is a requirement of strategy-proofness together with an additional property
like unanimity, efficiency, or ontoness (see, e.g., Barbera` et al., 1991; Sprumont, 1995;Weymark,
2008; Chatterji and Sen, 2011). But these approaches start from the very beginning with a
given domain (often related to single-peakedness) and a set of alternatives whose structure
is explicitly used in obtaining tops-onlyness as a requirement of strategy-proofness (and the
additional property). We face two difficulties in following this approach. The first is that we
do not impose any structure on the domain of the SCF except that it has to be rich and each
preference has a unique top, and no structure on the set of alternatives. It would be worthwhile
to identify conditions on domains at the level of generality of our model where unanimity and
strategy-proofness would ensure the tops-only property. These conditions can along with our
richness requirement be used to replicate our analysis without the tops-only axiom. This task is
outside the scope of the present study. Second, this approach implies that every strategy-proof
and unanimous SCF is tops-only. Our approach does not require the domain to be such that
every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF is tops-only; we merely require that there is one with
the tops-only property.
5.2. Example of aNonrichDomain. Ourmethodology relies on establishing that a two-agent
strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : D2 → A induces a semilattice
over A and that f takes the supremum form; that is, for every x, y ∈ A, sup(x, y) exists and
f (x, y) = sup(x, y). We show here that the rich domain condition is indispensable for this
property. It is well known that for domains with few preferences, it is possible to define strategy-
proof SCFs. The smaller the domain is the larger is the class of (often trivial) strategy-proof
SCFs that might operate on it. The literature contains several alternative concepts of rich
domains. However, all of them (as well as ours) are sufficient conditions that are far from being
necessary. This applies also to our setting: It is possible to find a semilattice (A,), a nonrich
and semilattice single-peaked domainD on (A,), and a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous,
and unanimous SCF defined on it.
The example below exhibits a domain D, a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unan-
imous SCF f : D2 → A whose induced partial order  over A is not a semilattice because for
some x, y ∈ A, sup(x, y) does not exist (and hence f (x, y) = sup(x, y)), and where D is not a
rich domain on (A,).
EXAMPLE 2. Let A= {x, y, z, z¯, w} be the set of alternatives and D the domain of five strict
preferences:
Px Py Pz Pz¯ Pw
x y z z¯ w
z z w w x
z¯ z¯ z¯ z y
w w x y z
y x y x z¯
Consider the strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : D2 → A defined
by the following table:
f x y z z¯ w
x x z z z¯ w
y z y z z¯ w
z z z z w w
z¯ z¯ z¯ w z¯ w
w w w w w w
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FIGURE 6
A PARTIAL ORDER THAT IS NOT A SEMILATTICE
The partial order  induced by f can be represented by Figure 6.
This partial order  is not a semilattice since sup(x, y) does not exist. But the domain D is
not rich on (A,) since z /∈ [x, z¯] = ∅ and there does not exist any Pˆx ∈ D such that xPˆxz¯Pˆxz;
observe that there are other missing preferences, for instance, any Pˆz¯ such that z¯Pˆz¯xPˆz¯z.
5.3. Relation to Other Concepts of Single-Peakedness. Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b,
2010) start with an abstract algebraic structure of a property space on a finite set of alterna-
tives and a concept of “betweenness” and use it to define the concept of generalized single-
peakedness. The necessity part of their characterization is similar to our analysis in spirit and
shows that if there exists an onto, strategy-proof, anonymous, and neutral SCF on a rich domain
of generalized single-peaked preferences induced by a property space, then this property space
is a median space.24 The concepts of generalized single-peakedness and semilattice single-
peakedness are related but independent of each other. For instance, the complete domain,
which never appears in our analysis, is a generalized single-peaked domain.
The domain of preferences we characterize is closer in spirit to semi-single-peaked do-
mains. Semilattice single-peakedness extends the concept of semi-single-peakedness in at
least three directions. The key differences are that the set of alternatives may be infinite
and preferences admit indifferences. The concept of semi-single-peakedness is built upon
an undirected graph that is necessarily a tree. The concept of semilattice single-peakedness
can be illustrated via a directed graph (which need not be a tree when viewed as an undi-
rected graph by ignoring the direction). Finally, the threshold (as described in Subsection 4.2)
does not have to be an alternative; for instance, when A= (0, 1) ⊂ R and the partial order
 is the natural order > on real numbers (a semilattice on (0, 1)), then 1 /∈ A would play
the role of the threshold in Chatterji et al.’s (2013) construction. We show below that the
analysis of Chatterji et al. (2013) is not implied by our analysis restricted to finitely many
alternatives.
24 See Bogomolnaia (1998) for representations of median voter schemes using medians on median graphs.
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FIGURE 7
A STRONGLY PATH-CONNECTED GRAPH
FIGURE 8
THE SEMILATTICE OF THE MEDIAN VOTER RULE F
EXAMPLE 3. Let A= {w, α, x, v, y} be the set of alternatives. We consider the following
domain D of exactly eight strict preferences given below:
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
w α α x x v v y
α w x α v x y v
x x w w α α x x
v v v v w w α α
y y y y y y w w
This domain is strongly path connected in the terminology of Chatterji et al. (2013) and
consequently satisfies their richness condition. The concept of a strongly path connected domain
canbe seen as follows: The alternativesw andα are said to be strongly connected since there exist
two preference orderings P1 and P2 that rank the alternatives x, v, and y identically, whereas
the positions of w and α, the top two ranked alternatives, are reversed across the two orderings.
Likewise α and x, x and v, and finally v and y are strongly connected. One now associates to this
domain a graph whose vertices are the five alternatives and where two vertices are an edge if
and only if they are strongly connected. A domain is said to be strongly path connected if this
graph is a connected graph. The domain D specified above is indeed a strongly path-connected
domain. Figure 7 depicts this strongly path-connected graph.
Now consider a median voter rule f : D2 → A, where the fixed ballot is located at α and
consider the partial order  associated with this SCF f as defined by (1). Namely, α  w and
α  x  v  y. Figure 8 depicts this semilattice.
Observe that [y, x] is nonempty and w /∈ [y, x]. This article’s concept of richness requires
that there exist a preference ordering where x is the top-ranked alternative and where y is
ranked above w. This condition is violated by P4 and P5 above. Thus, the richness condition of
Chatterji et al. (2013) does not imply that our richness condition will necessarily be satisfied. The
converse is also true since our concept of richness can be applied to multidimensional models
with multidimensional single-peaked (or separable) preferences that are excluded by strongly
path connected domains.25 Thus, the two concepts of richness and consequently the results of
the two papers are independent.
Savaglio and Vannucci (2014) consider a social choice setting where the set of alternatives
is a distributive lattice (A,≤) from which a latticial ternary betweenness relation is defined: z
lies between x and y if and only if x ∧ y ≤ z≤ x ∨ y, where the binary operations ∧ and ∨ are
25 Chatterji et al. (2016) characterize single-peaked preferences on a tree (as defined by Demange, 1983) on strongly
path-connected domains using random SCFs.
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the infimum and the supremum taken according to ≤, respectively. Agents’ preferences satisfy
some unimodality conditions that are consistent with this latticial ternary betweenness relation.
They study and characterize strategy-proof SCFs on such domains. Note that our setting admits
semilattices that are not necessarily lattices (the infimum of pairs of alternatives may not exist)
and, more importantly, we do not start by assuming a specific structure on the set of alternatives
but rather we obtain it as the consequence of the existence of a strategy-proof, tops-only,
anonymous, and unanimous SCF on a rich domain of preferences.
Reffgen (2015) considers the case where agents’ preferences are single-peaked with respect
to different linear orders and characterizes strategy-proof SCFs. These typically violate either
anonymity or unanimity or both, and, hence, we cannot obtain his analysis as a special case of
our approach as we did in Section 4 for other formulations of single-peakedness.
5.4. Characterization of All Strategy-Proof SCFs and Group Strategy-Proofness. Our results
indicate that the supremum rule is prominent in the class of strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous, and unanimous SCFs. On an arbitrary (rich or otherwise) domain of semilattice single-
peaked preferences, the supremum rule is shown in Proposition 2 to possess the aforementioned
properties. On the other hand, any SCF with these properties induces, under the hypothesis
of richness, a two-agent SCF that coincides with the supremum rule. A complete characteriza-
tion of all SCFs that are strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous on an arbitrary
domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences is outside the scope of the present study.
There are semilattice single-peaked domains for which strategy-proof SCFs need not be ef-
ficient (see, e.g., voting by quota in Subsection 4.3.2), and hence these SCFs are not group
strategy-proof. In particular, a profile of semilattice single-peaked preferences need not sat-
isfy the indirect sequential inclusion condition of Barbera` et al. (2010), which guarantees that
strategy-proof SCFs are group strategy-proof. One can expect therefore that the domain impli-
cations of replacing strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness will be considerably more
stringent. We leave the identification of such domains for future work.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we first consider the case where the domain D is assumed to admit a
strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF g : Dn → A, where n is a positive
odd integer. We subsequently include proofs of assertions omitted in the text and end with a
remark on the case where the set of alternatives is finite.
A.1. The Case of an Odd Number of Agents. We illustrate, using an example, the sort of
restrictions on the domain of preferences that are implied by the existence of a strategy-proof,
tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF with an odd number of agents.
EXAMPLE A.1. Assume the set of alternatives is the unit interval in the real line ordered with
the linear order >, that is, A= [0, 1] and the SCF g : D3 → A is a three agent SCF that takes
the form
g(P1,P2,P3) = med{t(P1), t(P2), t(P3), 0, 1}, for all (P1,P2,P3) ∈ D3,
that is, a median voter rule with two fixed ballots located at the extremes. Trivially, g is tops-
only, anonymous, and unanimous. Moreover, using Moulin (1980) and Berga and Serizawa
(2000), it can be easily verified that in this case, the strategy-proofness of g requires that D be
single-peaked on [0, 1].26 In particular, any weaker restriction of semilattice single-peakedness
(as in Figure 2) will never suffice for the strategy-proofness of g.
26 See Subsection 3.2 for the formal definition of single-peakedness and the median.
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The example above assumed a special structure on the set of alternatives and a very special
form of the SCF. The domain implications for the general case of an arbitrary g : Dn → A
where n is a positive odd integer is not attempted here. The purpose of the example is to
indicate that the domain implication arising from the hypothesis that there exists an SCF with
the required properties for an odd number of voters is likely to be considerably more restrictive
than semilattice single-peakedness. Proposition 2 illustrates that semilattice single-peakedness
suffices for the design of awell-behaved SCF for all numbers of voters; the additional restrictions
(e.g., of single-peakedness as in the example above) implied by the hypothesis of the existence
of a well-behaved SCF for an odd number of voters are in a sense spurious. We devote the
remainder of this section to identifying a class of SCFs that are defined on an odd number of
voters and where the restriction on the domain implied by the axioms is exactly semilattice
single-peakedness.
We will do so by introducing an additional axiom.27 This axiom requires that the SCFs satisfy
an invariance requirement across two profiles of preferences where agents tops are either of
two alternatives x or y, when the number of agents with top x and top y differ by exactly 1 across
the two profiles.
DEFINITION A.1. The SCF g : Dn → A, where n ≥ 3 is a positive odd integer, satisfies in-
variance if for every x, y ∈ A, for every i ∈ N, and for every pair of preference profiles of the
form (Ri,R−i), (R′i,R−i) ∈ Dn where t(Ri) = x and t(R′i) = y andR−i is any subprofile where n−12
agents have x as their top and n−12 have y as their top, it is the case that g(Ri,R−i) = g(R′i,R−i).
Let g : Dn → A be a tops-only SCF, where n ≥ 3 is a positive odd integer. Define the binary
relationo induced by g overAas follows: For all (x, y) ∈ A×A, let (x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
2




profile of top-ranked alternatives where the first n+12 agents have x as the top and the remaining
n−1
2 agents have y as the top and define
x o y if and only if g(x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
2




REMARK A.1. Let g : Dn → A, where n ≥ 3 is positive odd integer, be a tops-only SCF, and
o be the binary relation induced by g over A. If g is anonymous and satisfies invariance, then
o is antisymmetric. If g is unanimous, then o is reflexive.
REMARK A.2. The analogs of Lemmas 1 and 2 can be proved analogously for o as well by
standard arguments. We omit the details.
Finally, we obtain as Proposition 4 the extension of Proposition 3 to the case where n ≥ 3 is
a positive odd integer and the SCF satisfies in addition invariance.
PROPOSITION A.1. Let g : Dn → A be a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous
SCF that satisfies invariance where n ≥ 3 is a positive odd integer. Let o be the binary relation
induced by g over A and assume that D is rich on (A,o). Then, (i) o is a semilattice over A,
(ii) for all x, y ∈ A, g(x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
2
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
2
) = supo(x, y), and (iii) D is semilattice single-peaked on
(A,o).
27 We consider in Subsection A.1.1 a version of our analysis without this axiom.
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REMARK A.3. Part (iii) of the proposition establishes that D is semilattice single-peaked on
(A,o). Consequently, by an application of Proposition 2, there exists a strategy-proof, tops-
only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF f : Dn → A for all n. Furthermore, we note that the SCF
constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 also satisfies invariance.
EXAMPLE A.1 (CONTINUED). The median voter rule with two fixed ballots located at the ex-
tremes considered in Example 4 yields the most restrictions on preferences in the class of all
median voter rules with three agents for the case where A is the unit interval ordered with >.
Indeed, anymedian voter rule defined by positioning the two fixed ballots at distinct alternatives
other than 0 and 1 would impose less restriction on preferences and would admit domains of
preferences that would only strictly contain the set of single-peaked preferences on [0, 1]. The
least restrictive case would arise when the two fixed ballots are located on the same alternative;
the induced SCF would then satisfy invariance, and the domain restriction implied would be
exactly semilattice single-peakedness.
We first illustrate the content of the invariance axiom by exhibiting for well-known settings
SCFs that satisfy it and SCFs that do not.
Consider in the Moulin (1980) setting the SCF f : SP3 → [0, 1] that for all (x, y, z) ∈ [0, 1]3,
f (x, y, z) = med>{x, y, z, α1, α2}, where α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, f satisfies invariance if and only if
α1 = α2.
Consider the Barbera` et al. (1991) setting with n = 3 and K = 2. The SCF f : S3 → {0, 1}2
defined by quota q = (q1,q2) satisfies invariance if and only if q1 = 2 and q2 = 2.
Clearly, in theMoulin (1980) and in theBarbera` et al. (1991) settings, there aremany instances
of well-studied SCFs that satisfy all our requirements but violate invariance. But in both cases,
there indeed exist some SCFs that satisfy invariance in addition to the properties we have
imposed in this article.28 In what follows, we provide a brief account of the picture without
assuming invariance.
A.1.1 Odd number of agents without invariance. We continue the analysis of an odd number
of agents by not imposing invariance of the SCF. At the end of this subsection, we introduce
invariance in order to understand its role in Proposition 4.
We restrict attention to the case n = 3. By the cloning method employed in Fact 1, we can
induce such an SCF whenever one exists for an odd number of agents that is divisible by 3.
Let f : D3 → A be a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF. Fix x ∈ A
and define, following a procedure also introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998), gx : D2 → A by
setting, for each pair y, z ∈ A, gx(y, z) = f (x, y, z). Then, gx is a strategy-proof, tops-only, and
anonymous SCF. Note that we cannot deduce that gx is unanimous since gx(y, y) = y does not
follow from the assumed unanimity of f . Let x be the binary relation induced by gx over A
using (1). Remark 1 applies, and the binary relation x is antisymmetric but cannot be assumed
reflexive since gx(y, y) = y is not guaranteed.
We will therefore consider binary relations that are antisymmetric and transitive (which will
follow from the richness axiom we introduce below) and refer to them as orders. The following
definitions generalize our concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness to the case at
hand.
DEFINITION A.2. Let A be an arbitrary set. A family of orders {r}r∈A over A is given. The
domainD is rich on (A, {r}r∈A) if for any y, z, w ∈ A, if [y, z]x is nonempty for some x ∈ A and
w /∈ [y, z]x , then there exist Ryi ,Rzi ∈ D such that zPyi w and yPzi w.
DEFINITION A.3. Let {r}r∈A be a family of orders over A. The domain D is order-family
single-peaked on (A, {r}r∈A) if for all x, y, z, w ∈ A and all Rxi ,Rzi ∈ D,
28 However, the example in appendixA ofNehring and Puppe (2010) exhibits a domain that admits a unique strategy-








To see why conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition A.3 follow from strategy-proofness, consider
x, y, z, w ∈ A and any Rx2,Rz1 ∈ D. Then (i) follows from supw(x, y) = f (w, x, y)Rx2f (w, z, y) =
supw(z, y) and (ii) follows from supz(x, y) = f (z, x, y)Rz1 supw(x, y) = f (w, x, y).
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 do not require that the two-agent SCF under consideration
satisfy unanimity. These lemmas apply here if the domain D is rich on (A, {r}r∈A) (in the
sense of Definition A.2). We omit the details. Consequently, analogously to Proposition 3, we
obtain here for all x, y, z ∈ A, gx(y, z) = supx(y, z) and D is order-family single-peaked on
(A, {r}r∈A).
To summarize, if a domain D admits a three-agent SCF satisfying strategy-proofness, tops-
onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity and the richness condition is satisfied, then D is order-
family single-peaked on (A, {r}r∈A). However, we have been unable to evaluate whether this
concept of single-peakednesswould suffice for the design of a strategy-proof SCF satisfying tops-
onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity. This is the principal difficulty in extending our analysis for
an even number of agents in Section 2 to the case of an odd number of agents.
We are, however, able to design an SCF with the required four properties if we introduce
additionally a concept of invariance of the family of orders. We express invariance in terms of
the family of orders as follows:We say that the family of orders {r}r∈A satisfies order-invariance
if supx(x, y) = supy(x, y) for all pairs (x, y). This condition would be implied by the existence
of an SCF defined for an odd number of agents that satisfies strategy-proofness, tops-onlyness,
anonymity, unanimity, and invariance in the sense of Definition A.1.
We may now define a two-agent SCF in the following manner; for any pair (x, x) of
alternatives, define f (x, x) = x, whereas for any pair (x, y), x = y, of alternatives, define
f (x, y) = supx(x, y) = supy(x, y). It is evident that this SCF satisfies anonymity, and unanim-
ity and is tops-only. This SCF will also satisfy strategy-proofness whenever D is order-family
single-peaked on (A, {r}r∈A). Indeed, we have f (x, y) = supy(x, y)Rxi supy(z, y) = f (z, y) by
(i) of Definition A.3. This verification of strategy-proofness uses the invariance of the family of
orders in a central way and breaks down without it.
A.2. Multidimensional Semilattice Single-Peakedness. Wenowprove that in themultidimen-
sional model, the following characterization of semilattice single-peaked preferences holds.
The preference Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A,) if and only if for all y, z ∈ A such
that y ∈ MB(x, α) ∩MB(x, z), yRxi z.
First, we show that if Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A,), then for all y, z ∈ A such that
y ∈ MB(x, α) ∩MB(x, z), yRxi z. Since y ∈ MB(x, α), it is true that y  x, and hence, sup(x, y) =
y. Moreover, y ∈ MB(x, z), implies that, for each k = 1, . . . ,K, either xk ≤ yk ≤ zk or zk ≤
yk ≤ xk. Before proceeding, we identify from (A,) a family of semilattices (Ak,k), one for
each component k, which correspond to the semilattice of the one-dimensional case. For each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the pair (Ak,k) is a semilattice where k is defined as follows: For xk, yk ∈ Ak,
xk k yk if and only if either yk ≤ xk ≤ αk or αk ≤ xk ≤ yk.
Assume without loss of generality that xk ≤ yk ≤ zk. Since xk ≤ yk ≤ αk, supk(xk, zk) =
supk(yk, zk) = αk if αk ≤ zk and supk(xk, zk) = supk(yk, zk) = zk otherwise. Hence,
sup(x, z) = sup(y, z). By semilattice single-peakedness, we know that sup(x, z)Rxi sup(z, z).
Thus, sup(y, z)R
x
i z. Since sup(x, y)R
x
i sup(z, y) by semilattice single-peakedness, we have
yRxi z as required.
Conversely, we show that if for all y, z ∈ A such that y ∈ MB(x, a) ∩MB(x, z), yRxi z, then
Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A,). Given y, z ∈ A, to show that sup(x, y)Rxi sup(z, y),
it suffices to show that sup(x, y) ∈ MB(x, α) ∩MB(x, sup(z, y)). Since sup(x, y)  x, it is
evident that sup(x, y) ∈ MB(x, α). Next, to show that sup(x, y) ∈ MB(x, sup(z, y)), we
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simplify the notation and let sup(x, y) = w and sup(z, y) = w′. We know that for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, wk = med>(xk, yk, αk) and w′k = med>(zk, yk, αk). Assume without loss of gen-
erality that xk ≤ yk. Consider three situations: (i) wk = xk, (ii) wk = αk, and (iii) wk = yk. In
situation (i), it is evident that either xk ≤ wk ≤ w′k or w′k ≤ wk ≤ xk. In situation (ii), we know
that xk ≤ αk ≤ yk. Consequently, w′k = med>(xk, yk, αk) ≥ αk = wk. Hence, xk ≤ wk ≤ w′k. In
situation (iii), we know that αk ≥ yk. Consequently, w′k = med>(xk, yk, αk) ≥ yk = wk. Hence,
xk ≤ wk ≤ w′k. In conclusion, wk is always in the middle of xk and w′k for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Therefore, sup(x, y) ∈ MB(x, sup(z, y)) as required.
A.3. The Binary Relation in Voting by Quota. We show that in the voting by quota model,
the binary relation , obtained by setting for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}K,
x  y if and only if x ∈ MB(α, y),
is induced by f over A by condition (1).
Assume x  y. We want to show that f (x, y) = x; that is, f k(x, y) = xk for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
Take an arbitrary k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and assume first that f k(x, y) = 1. Since f is voting by quota,
xk + yk = 0. If xk + yk = 2, then xk = 1 and f k(x, y) = xk. Assume now that xk + yk = 1. Since f
is voting by quota, qk = 1, and by the definition of α, αk = 1. To obtain a contradiction, suppose
xk = 0. Since, by the definition of , x ∈ MB(α, y) holds, we have that yk = 0, a contradiction
with the assumption that xk + yk = 1. Assume now that f k(x, y) = 0. Then, xk + yk < qk. If
xk = 0, then f k(x, y) = xk, which is what we wanted to prove. If xk = 1, then qk = 2, αk = 0, and
yk = 0. Hence, x /∈ MB(α, y). Thus, x  y, a contradiction. Since k was arbitrary, f (x, y) = x.
To prove the other implication in the definition of x  y by (1), assume f (x, y) = x. We want
to show that x  y. Take an arbitrary k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Suppose first that xk = 0. If yk = 1, then
qk = 2 and αk = 0. Namely, (i) xk = αk = 0, and yk = 1. If yk = 0, then either qk = 1, in which
case αk = 1, or qk = 2, in which case αk = 0. Namely, either (ii) xk = yk = 0 and αk = 1 or (iii)
xk = yk = αk = 0 . Suppose now that xk = 1. If yk = 1, then either qk = 1, in which case αk = 1,
or qk = 2, in which case αk = 0. Namely, either (iv) xk = yk = αk = 1 or (v) xk = yk = 1 and
αk = 0. If yk = 0, then qk = 1, in which case αk = 1. Namely, (vi) xk = αk = 1 and yk = 0. Hence,
(i) to (vi) hold for an arbitrary k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Thus, x ∈ MB(α, y), and by definition of , x  y
holds.
A.4. Finite Set of Alternatives. We identify in the corollary below a set of necessary con-
ditions on any strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF that applies to the
case where the set of alternatives is finite and n is an even positive integer. This is obtained by
combining Proposition 3 with a result on two-agent SCFs from Bogomolnaia (1998).
COROLLARY A.1. Let (D,A,) be such that D is rich on (A,) and A is finite. If there exists
a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous, and unanimous SCF g : Dn → A, where n ≥ 2 is an even
positive integer that induces  over A, then (i) A⊆ {0, 1}K for some positive integer K, (ii) there
exists α ∈ A such that f k(xk, yk) = med>(xk, yk, αk) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and x, y ∈ A, where the
SCF f : D2 → A is induced by g, and (iii)D is semilattice single-peaked on (A,) or, equivalently,
for all x, y, z ∈ A, [y ∈ MB(x, α) ∩MB(x, z)] ⇒ [yRxi z].
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